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Takashi Iida¤
This paper is concerned with an issue in the ontology of language. The ques-
tion we wish to ask is this, namely, given that a language consists of linguistic
types which are abstract objects, and that abstract objects do not exist in time,
how is it possible for a language to change?
We start with drawing a distinction between linguistic types and tokens (x1).
Then, in x2 it will be argued that linguistic types are contingent abstract objects.
After trying to locate linguistic types among various type entities in x3, we note
that the ontological status of linguistic types has an important epistemological
consequence that we have a posteriori knowledge of abstract objects such as
linguistic types, because we come to know their properties by encountering their
tokens in our experience (x4). If a language is a system of abstract objects, then
it does not exist in time, and hence, it cannot change. But, we talk of a language
as if it is constantly changing. How can such contradictory claims be reconciled?
This is the main question of this paper and the business of x5 is to try to answer
it. In answering it, we propose to make two corrections to our way of talking
about language. First, \language change" is, in reality, a replacement of one
language by another. Strictly speaking, languages cannot change; only linguistic
practices change. Second, language names such as \Japanese," \French," or
even \¯rst-order language" are not singular names but common names. We
should admit there are a great number of di®erent languages which are all
called \Japanese."
1 Types and Tokens of Linguistic Expressions
How do we proceed to specify a language in an explicit way? First, we should
specify a vocabulary, a set of words that form the fundamental elements of the
language. In many cases, words are classi¯ed into several classes, which are
called categories according to the role they play in sentences. A vocabulary
must be a ¯nite set. Otherwise, we could not decide whether a given expression
belongs to a given language or not 1. After having speci¯ed a vocabulary, we
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1Is it really necessary that we should be able to determine whether a given expression
belongs to our language or not? Is it not conceivable that a language we use has an in¯nite
vocaburaly and at any time we know only a part of our language? If such a state of a®airs
is possible, then we might have a straightfoward route to our claim in this section, that is,
that we should admit the existence of abstract linguistic objects like types as well as concrete
linguistic objects like tokens. For, supposedly, under the current cosmological assumption,
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should state the rules for forming complex expressions from the words in the
vocabulary. We form a phrase by combining words, and a sentence by combining
phrases. Let us call a word a simple expression, and a phrase or sentence a
complex expression 2.
If a recursion can be repeated without restrictions in a language, it is possible
to form an in¯nite number of complex expressions, and hence, an in¯nite number
of sentences. Of course, it is impossible that the whole in¯nite variety of these
sentences is actually produced; on the contrary, it is certain that there are
sentences that will never be pronounced or written. Even though each sentence
is ¯nite in length, its length can be arbitrarily large if the language allows
unrestricted recursion. Thus, if the current assumption that our universe is
¯nite in both space and time is correct, it happens that we don't have time
or space enough to present certain very long sentences. It is not di±cult to
imagine such sentences. Just take a simple rule for forming logical conjunctions
in a language for propositional logic, and apply it many times over to just one
propositional letter, say, P .
Even in a language where only a ¯nite number of sentences are possible,
there may be many complex expressions that are permitted by grammar and
yet never encountered in reality. Suppose that Japanese were a ¯nite language
where recursion is not unrestricted. If this were true, the language would still be
complex enough to contain many grammatically correct expressions that have
never been used, and will never be used in the future. Moreover, there may be
Japanese sentences that happen never to be used by anybody, simply owing to
pure chance.
Thus, in any language, many of the sentences that are judged to be gram-
matically correct will be never used, and hence, never produced in any way
whatsoever. It seems only natural to say that these \unrealized" sentences have
only a possible existence (rather than a real one). One role of the grammar of
a language is to give the totality of the possible sentences in the language. As
even such huge sentences that cannot be contained in our universe are among
the \possible" sentences, the possibility we are concerned with here should not
be physical possibility, but one much more akin to logical possibility.
To hold that an unrealized sentence has only possible existence is to think
that existence for a sentence is the same as existence in space and time, and
hence, that a sentence is a spatiotemporal object. If we make the distinction
between possible existence and actual existence for sentences, we must hold
that the actual existence of a sentence is nothing but its being produced in a
particular time and place.
In general, our way of talking about sentences or linguistic expressions sug-
it is impossible for our universe to contain a token for every word of this in¯nite language,
provided that each token is at least recognizable to us; hence, we admit the existence of
linguistic types which have no tokens.
2In a natural language, a word is represented by a combination of sounds, letters, or
gestures, whereas a word is represented by a simple symbol in many arti¯cial languages made
for the purpose. But, the fact that a word has a complex representation in a natural language
is irrelevant to the following discussion.
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gests that we are not treating them as spatiotemporal entities. This can be
observed from the way we use the phrase \the same sentence". Please look at
the following example:
We had a terribly hot summer this year.
We had a terribly hot summer this year.
What are we going to say about this? Here we have two sentences that are the
same. But how can we say that? If there are two things of the same kind, they
should be di®erent from each other, and it is therefore impossible that they are
the same. Is it not a contradiction to say that here are two dogs which are the
same dog?
The key to solving this puzzle is in the fact that the word \sentence" can be
used in two di®erent ways. As is frequently the case, the apparent contradiction
we have here is caused by ambiguity. When we say that we have two sentences,
\sentence" refers to some spatiotemporal entity, whereas the word \sentence"
in the phrase \which are the same sentence" could not refer to a spatiotemporal
entity. In the latter case, a sentence is construed as something which does not
exist in space and time, and is called \a sentence as a type". In the former
case, a sentence is construed as something that exists in space and time, and is
called \a sentence as a token". It is not di±cult to see that a similar distinction
applies to linguistic expressions in general 3.
A sentence as a token is a concrete entity that is located in a particular time
and place. It can be an event consisting of a series of sounds or gestures, or a
material object like the stains of ink on a paper. Although an expression as a
token is an entity which is bound to one particular time and place, we regard a
linguistic expression as something that can be used repeatedly in di®erent times
and places, just like a tool. Here, we are thinking of expressions as types.
When we scold our child for her bad writing, or complain to someone else
of not catching what she said, we are concerned with tokens. However, most of
the time when we are talking about a language, we are concerned with types.
If someone says that he missed the name mentioned, and goes on to ask what
the name the other person mentioned was, it is obvious that what he wants is
not a name as a token but a name as a type.
If you wish to know what sort of things constitute a given kind, you can do
so by examining the conditions under which these things can be identical. Our
considerations on what we understand by \same sentence" or \same expression"
show that we regard sentences, or linguistic expressions in general, as types that
are not located in space and time. As types can be counted and named, they
should be regarded as objects. Let us call those objects which exist in space and
time concrete objects, and those which do not exist in space and time abstract
objects. Therefore, types are abstract objects.
3It should be obvious there is also a distinction between type and token for sounds, letters,
and gestures that constitute (representations) of words.
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2 The Ontology of Linguistic Types
Standard examples of abstract objects in philosophy are mathematical objects,
such as numbers and sets. These objects exist necessarily if they exist; they are
not contingent beings. Is this also true of linguistic types? That is, do they
exist necessarily if they exist? The answer to this question wholly depends on
what the existence of a linguistic type consists in.
At least for a simple type like a word, it seems correct to say that the
existence of its type amounts to the same as the existence of its tokens. It does
not make sense to insist that a word has existence as a type, in spite of the non-
existence of its tokens. Among the possible combinations of Japanese syllables,
some are already realized as Japanese words, and some are not. Those that do
not constitute actual words in Japanese must be regarded only as possible word
types, and hence, have no existence.
As a token is a concrete entity, its existence is always a contingent matter.
Therefore, a simple type like a word, whose existence depends on the existence
of its tokens, is a contingent abstract object. Although you might ¯nd this
conclusion very strange, it is not so strange as it seems on the surface. Take
any word in Japanese. It is entirely contingent that it belongs to the current
vocabulary of the language. The matter is more obvious for a type entity other
than linguistic expressions; there is no doubt that a ¯lm such as Tokyo Story or
the symphony known as Jupiter came to exist only contingently.
As a type does not exist in time (unlike a token), it would be senseless to
say that a type begins to exist at a certain time or ceases to exist at a certain
time. Nevertheless, we tend to think that a word ceases to exist as a type if
nobody will use it. Similarly, we tend to think that the ¯lm Tokyo Story itself
will no longer exist when all the prints, DVDs, scenarios, etc. are lost.
Though it seems natural to think in this way, the \naturalness" of this way
of thinking derives from the fact that our conception of existence is heavily
biased towards existence in time. Compared to tensed existential predicates
like \existed", \exists" and \will exist", an untensed existential predicate always
sounds unnatural. In particular, we are inclined to think that the existential
predicates which are appropriate for a type entity are tensed ones, because
the existence of a type entity depends on the existence of tokens (which are
spatiotemporal entities). However, as a type entity is not in space or time, a
tensed predicate cannot apply to it.
What might be helpful for us is a distinction between real and unreal: This
distinction applies to both temporal existents and non-temporal existents. Thus,
we can use the predicate \is real" as an untensed existential predicate. As tokens
are temporal entities, for them to be real means the same as one of the tensed
existential predicates applying to them. For types, which are not temporal
entities, their reality cannot be the same as the applicability of such tensed
existential predicates.
In what circumstances is a word or a ¯lm as a type a real word or ¯lm? It
is real when there are corresponding tokens; that is, when a tensed existential
predicate applies to them. If such a token is going to exist in the future, we may
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not always know with certainty that a type in question is real. Such a limitation
in our knowledge is only an epistemological problem, which is independent of
ontological concerns. What is obvious is that a type is real insofar as there are
some past tokens or future tokens, even if there are no tokens of it at present.
Even though every token of Tokyo Story is lost, this fact does not make Tokyo
Story an unreal ¯lm; similarly, even though one of our words now in use shall
disappear completely in the future, and thus the future generations will have
no clue as to its existence, the word will not become an unreal word.
I hope our conclusion that a simple type such as a word is a contingent
abstract object has now become less strange, by the considerations we have
o®ered here. The next thing we should consider is what constitutes the existence
of a complex type, such as a phrase or a sentence.
The most straightforward answer to this question is that the existence of
a complex type is embodied in the existence of its tokens, just as in the case
of a simple type. According to this answer, a grammatically correct phrase or
sentence that is never to be produced in the entire history of the universe does
not exist. Though this seems to be a perfectly reasonable conclusion, there is
one problem here.
Let us remember that a word is a contingent being. Hence, there are possible
words that are not in fact real. It is easy to imagine a possible word which
might have been an English word but never becomes one. For example, the
expression \agor" is a possible combination of English syllables but it is not an
English word. Let us suppose that this combination of syllables never becomes
an English word in the future, either. Still this expression might be a word in
English, say, an adjective. Thus, this expression is a type entity which exists
only in possibility. Moreover, we can form a possible phrase or a sentence like
\an agor student" or \She is very agor", using this possible word. If you compare
these possible expressions with those grammatically correct expressions which
happen to have no tokens, you might have the impression that the latter kind of
expressions are \much more real" than the former. There is a reason for such an
impression: The possibility of the latter kind of expressions is already contained
in an actual language, whereas the possibility of the former kind is not.
One way to be faithful to such an impression is to hold that a complex
type such as a phrase or a sentence exists not only possibly but actually, if the
grammar of the language allows its formation. More formally, this can be stated
thus:
A complex type ® exists if and only if all simple types which are
components of ® exist.
Here it is assumed that the term \simple type" covers not only words but also
basic operations, like concatenating words. For such an operation its existence is
the same as the existence of its tokens. As the necessary and su±cient condition
for the existence of a simple type is the existence of its tokens, the following is
true.
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A complex type ® exists if and only if all simple types which are
components of ® have their tokens.
Our claim that a complex type like a phrase or a sentence has existence in
spite of the nonexistence of its tokens agrees with our way of speaking when
we wish to state something general about linguistic matters. Consider one such
generalization: In Japanese a new noun phrase can be formed from two noun
phrases by using the particle \no". There are two things worth noting in the
way this generalization is stated. Firstly, no one thinks that this generalization
applies only to those noun phrases which happen to have tokens. Secondly, no
one thinks that this generalization applies even to those possible noun phrases
that contain words that are not part of actual Japanese. In other words, the
quanti¯cational domain for such a generalization over types consists of all of the
expressions which can be formed from the actual words, and it does not matter
whether these expressions have their tokens or not. In the light of the close tie
between existence and being in the domain of quanti¯cation, this means that
the existence of tokens is not required for a complex type to exist.
In sum, there are three ways for a linguistic type to exist.
(a) A linguistic type exists as a type with a token.
(b) It exists as a type without any token.
(c) It exists only possibly as a possible type.
A simple type like a word always belongs to the category (a). A complex type
such as a phrase or a sentence belongs to either (a) or (b). To the category (c)
belongs a word that is not actual or a complex expression which contains such
a word. As we argued above, the category (a) consists of contingent abstract
objects. The same can be said of the category (b), because the existence of a
complex type depends on the existence of simple types, which in turn depends on
the existence of their tokens. Lastly, the category (c) consists of the contingent
abstract objects that happen not to exist.
3 The Variety of Type Entities
The distinction between type and token is applicable not only to linguistic ex-
pressions but also to a variety of things we encounter in everyday life. It is
easy to recognize that there is a type-token distinction in the commodities we
consume or use. For example, there is ambiguity in saying \She and I drive the
same car." It might mean either that she and I are the joint owners of a single
car and use it in turn, or that she and I own and drive cars of the same make.
In the former interpretation we are concerned with token, and in the latter we
are concerned with type. If we consider sentences like \They wear the same
clothes" and \The two men ordered the same dish," it is much more di±cult to
interpret them as being concerned with tokens. In the consumer society we now
live in, we are surrounded by a vast number of the mass-produced commodities
which have a certain speci¯ed design and function in common. Each design
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determines a type, and an individual commodity which is produced after the
design and sent to the market is the token.
A type-token distinction is also applicable to natural kinds and individual
entities belonging to the kind. In the sentence \The Siberian tiger is now facing
extinction," \Siberian tiger" refers to a type, whereas the same expression refers
to a token in a sentence \A Siberian tiger is in the next cage." The entities that
belong to the same natural kind are produced (or reproduced) in such a way
that they have certan traits in common. Further, we ¯nd that these individual
entities and the kind are called by the same name 4.
It has been frequently noted that the type-token distinction plays an im-
portant role in various genres of art. We all know that songs sung by di®erent
singers on very di®erent occasions are still the same songs, and that novels pub-
lished in di®erent formats, even in di®erent languages, are still the same novels.
When we talk about a musical composition, not the performance itself, or when
we talk about a certain famous novel, not a copy that I bought at my local
bookstore, we talk about type entities.
In general, there are three kinds of cases in which the type-token distinction
is applicable. First, there are cases such as commodities and natural kinds in
which numerous individuals are produced or reproduced according to the same
speci¯cation. Second, there are cases such as tonal systems and languages, which
are systematic in character and consist of elements that di®er in complexity.
Finally, there are cases such as musical compositions and novels whose existence
depends on the systems that ¯gure in the second sort of case.
Although musical compositions and novels are works of art to which the
type-token distinction applies, it should be noted there are works of art to
which it does not apply. It is not appliable to paintings and sculptures. In such
genres, the original is absolutely unique, and even the most perfect copy is still
only a copy. Even if two paintings or sculptures are so similar that nobody can
distinguish them from each other, what we have are two di®erent paintings or
sculptures.
Among works of art to which the type-token distinction is applicable, there
are those which are similar to commodities in the sense that they are produced
after a previously speci¯ed design. The obvious examples are woodcuts and
lithographs; photographs are another example. We may also include ¯lms in this
class. Here we should note the fact that a ¯lm has to be screened for watching.
This fact leads us to two di®erent views as to what should be regarded as a
token of a ¯lm. According to one view, only a screened ¯lm is the token of
the ¯lm; a token of Tokyo Story is nothing but a particular event which is its
screening, and there are as many tokens of Tokyo Story as there are screenings
4The fact hat a type-token distinction applies to both commodities and natural kinds
suggests that there might be many similarities between natural kind names and names given
to commercial commodities (brand names). Just as a natural kind name is introduced into our
language as signifying a natural kind as type, a brand name is introduced into our language
as signifying a commodity type. Hence, there is a good reason to think that brand names
have most of the semantic properties which were ascribed to natural kind names by Putnam
and Kripke in the 1970's.
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of the same ¯lm. On the other hand, according to the other view, a token of
Tokyo Story is not necessarily its screening. It can also be some physical object
like a set of reels of the ¯lm, a videotape, or a disk. If we adopt this second
view, there are two di®erent categories of things among the tokens of Tokyo
Story , namely, events like the screenings of the ¯lm and physical objects like
tapes and disks.
Let us return to the case of musical compositions and novels. A musical
composition usually depends on some system of tonal sounds, which is compa-
rable to a language. In this respect, a musical composition resembles a literary
work like a poem or a novel. Just as the existence of a particular token of The
Tale of Genji depends on the existence of a series of tokens of Japanese words,
the existence of a particular token of Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue depends
on the fact that a number of the token sounds that belong to the tone system
characteristic of modern Western music are distributed appropriately in time 5.
All this shows that a literay work and a musical composition are type entities
which presuppose the existence of systems of another sort of type entity such as
a language or a tonal system, whose elements are the material from which the
literay or musical work is made.
From the fact that some kind of type entities are dependent on more basic
entities, it does not follow that the former are reducible to the latter. For
example, nobody would think that a literary work could be completely explained
by the intrinsic properties of the language in which it was written. Thus, nobody
would think that all that can be said about The Tale of Genji is derivable from
facts about the vocabulary and grammar of the Japanese language of the time
it was written. But, at the same time, in order to see how a particular work
of literature or music is organized, we should know beforehand the system of
types upon which the existence of these works depends. This means that we
can safely leave the examination of type entities like literary works and musical
compositions until later in our ontological investigation of type entities. Then
we are left with only two kinds of type entities, those represented by commercial
commodities and natural kinds, and those represented by languages and tonal
systems.
When we compare these two kinds of type entities, we will ¯nd that there
is a noticeable di®erence in how indispensable they are to our overall ontology.
This is suggested by the fact that we can identify an object which is a token of
some commodity without knowing the type it is a token of. I don't know the
make of the car which is always parked at the end of my street. But I know
that it is a car, and I can even judge whether the car I see now is the same one
I saw yesterday 6.
5Just as a token of a ¯lm might be an event or a physical object, a token of a poem
or a musical composition might be an event or a physical object. In one extreme view,
only a recited poem is a token of a poem and only a performed composition is a token of a
musical composition. But, in the other view which is not so extreme, a token of a poem or a
composition might also be a physical object like a book, a printed score, or, a CD.
6The same applies to natural kinds. I don't need to know the exact species of the birds
which visit my garden in order to see whether I see the same birds every morning.
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The matter is much di®erent with linguistic tokens. Let us consider the
simplest case, that of letters of the alphabet. Suppose we travel to a country
whose letters we have no knowledge of. It will not be di±cult to have some idea
about the shapes of their letters, if we can recognize a signboard, a book, or a
newspaper there. But however often we encounter such letter tokens, we will
not know how many letter tokens there are in a supposed series of letters, or
where one letter token begins and ends, if we are not taught the letters of the
language as types. We can recognize a letter in a variety of fonts or styles only
because we have an idea of that letter as type.
A letter as type is an abstract object which does not have a spatial or
temporal location, in contrast to a letter token which is a concrete object that
exists at a particular time and place. Given this, it sounds paradoxical to say
that knowledge of a letter as type is necessary for the recognition of a letter as
token. It cannot be true that we already know the letters of the language of the
country we have never visited before unless we studied the language in school.
Because in our experience we encounter only concrete things and events, our
encounters with letters are nothing but encounters with letter tokens. As we
have only tokens, how do we come to know letter types, which are abstract.
The matter is still more serious. If knowledge of the letter type is necessary for
recognition of a particular token as a letter token, how is it possible for us to
have knowledge of a letter token in the ¯rst place?
What applies to letters applies to linguistic expressions in general. On one
hand, when all we have are only concrete tokens, how can we come to know
about abstract types? On the other hand, if we can know a token only through
the knowledge of a type, how can we know a token in the ¯rst place?
4 The Epistemology of Linguistic Types
Although a type is given to us only through its tokens, we cannot recognize each
token as such without an idea of a relevant type. This is the dilemma we are
facing. Let us label its horns as (i) and (ii). Thus, the two horns of the dilemma
are
(i) a type is given to us only through its tokens, and
(ii) we cannot recognize a token as such without an idea of its type.
This dilemma arises also for an infant who has no language and is going to
acquire one, as well as for a linguist who tries to learn a language unknown to
her.
If asked how a type becomes known through its token, we might be tempted
to reply in the following way: ¯rst, the tokens which resemble each other are
collected into one group, and then a type is abstracted as a common character-
istic of those tokens in the group. But obviously such a story is not plausible, if
we admit the validity of (ii) which says that there cannot be a token recognition
without an idea of its type. To convince ourselves that it is utterly impossible
to get a type by abstraction from the tokens which resemble each other, it is
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su±cient to note the fact that a wide variety of designs can represent the same
letter. It is no exaggeration to say that only characteristic which is shared by
all the tokens of the letter \A" is being a token of the letter type\A."
But then, according to the other horn of the dilemma, namely (i), it seems
impossible to have the idea of the letter type \A" in the ¯rst place. A person who
has never seen any token of \A" cannot have an idea of the type \A." It is absurd
to claim that the type \A" is known a priori, even if it might not be absurd to
claim that mathematical objects like numbers are known a priori. Then it seems
that we should conclude that we come to have knowledge about types, which are
abstract objects, in an a posteriori way through the experince of encountering
its tokens. This conclusion, however, embodies the seemingly absurd idea that
we have empirical knowledge about abstract objects 7. Moreover, we are still far
from escaping from horn (ii) of the dilemma according to which encountering a
token presupposes the knowledge of its type.
It might be helpful to consider how perception of a material object is possible.
Strictly speaking, the only information about a material object that is given to
us through our senses is about its surface at a particular instant. This is true
not only of vision, but also of touch, which has the same importance as vision
in the perception of a material object; what is given in touch at each instant
is concerned with only a part of the object, and not the whole, and in that
sense what is touched at a particular instant is only a \surface" and not the
whole object. Although a material object is more than the totality of the sense
perceptions of its surface, there can be no doubt that we succeed in perceiving a
material object which endures in time and extends in three dimensional space.
Still it is true that no perception of an object is possible without perception of
its surface.
But can we have a perception of the surface of an object without having an
idea of a material object? In the ¯rst half of the 20th century, several attempts
were made to explain how we construct the idea of a material object from a
class of surface perceptions which resemble each other. Bertrand Russell's Our
Knowledge of the External World (1914) is an early example, a much later one is
Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appearance (1951), and in between we have
Rudolf Carnap's Die logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). The present consensus
about the feasibility of such attempts seems to be negative. Therefore, it is
impossible to get the idea of a material object from only surface perceptions,
although the latter are indispensable to the former.
Thus, we have a dilemma similar to the one about linguistic types and tokens.
Whereas
7IN his paper \Types and tokens in linguistics" S.Bromberger pointed out that it is philo-
sophically problematic that knowledge of type can be had only through tokens (A.George
(ed.), Re°ections on Chomsky, 1989, Blackwell, pp.58{89). But it must be remembered that
the same point had been already made by C.Parsons in his paper \Mathematical intuition"
(Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1980) 145{168). In particular, note the following
passage: \The problem about the timelessness of types is really epistemological: how can we
know truths about types by a certain kind of perception of tokens, which are then valid for
any tokens of the type involved" (p.160; emphasis is by Parsons).
10
(i) a material object is given only through perception of its surface,
we have to hold that
(ii) we cannot have any perception of a surface without an idea of a
material object.
To begin with, as a matter of fact, when we perceive a material object, we
are not conscious that what is given immediately to us is only its \surface."
We regard ourselves to be perceiving a three-dimensional body which endures
in time. Surface perceptions of material objects are always accompanied by
thoughts about currently unperceived parts of the objects. It is rather di±cult
to have a \pure" surface perception, because our surface perceptions are almost
always \impure" in the sense that they are accompanied by ideas of enduring
three-dimensional objects 8.
We would like to suggest that something similar holds also in the perception
of linguistic expression. When we see or hear words, we are not aware that
what is given to us are tokens, which are physical events or objects. We regard
ourselves to be seeing or hearing types, which can be written or said again at
di®erent times and places. This may be supported by the fact that it requires
conscious e®ort on our part to become aware of the mere physical sound or
design of a word, instead of phonemes or letters. We also know that if we say or
write the same word again and again, it loses its linguistic \shape" and is felt
to be a mere sound or design. As the word's \shape" is sustained by the idea of
type, the word ceases to be a linguistic entity when the idea of type drops out.
We should conclude that when we perceive a linguistic expression we perceive
a type rather than a token, just as when we perceive a material object we
perceive a three-dimensional object enduring in time rather than a surface.
Just as the perception of material objects involves the understanding that its
objects are three-dimensional and endure in time, the perception of linguistic
expressions involves the understanding that its objects are type entities which
can have various instances at di®erent times and places.
Now do these considerations help us to solve our dilemma? First let us
take up the question of how we come to know about types, which are abstract
objects, when all we have are tokens, which are concrete objects.
The most straightforward answer is that we perceive abstract objects them-
selves when we perceive linguistic expressions. Just as we perceive material
objects themselves rather than their surfaces when we perceive our environ-
ment, we perceive abstract types rather than concrete tokens, which are physical
events or objects, when we perceive linguistic expressions. However, we should
note that these abstract objects depend on their concrete tokens in an essential
way: every perception of a type depends on some token object which exists at
the time or on some auditory or visual event caused by the token object. In
general, a linguistic type is a contingent being because its existence depends on
that of its tokens. The claim that linguistic types are abstract objects which
8We owe these points to Shozo Ohmori. Among many writings of his, see, for example,
Mono to Kokoro (Thing and Mind, 1976, Tokyo: The Tokyo University Press).
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exist contingently has an epistemological correlate in the claim that we have a
posteriori and empirical knowledge about abstract objects when we know facts
about linguistic types.
But then, if we perceive a type when we hear or see a token, how is it possible
for us to learn a new expression? It is not only that. How is it possible for us
to acquire a language at all? For though a type is given to us only through its
tokens, according to the present view we can recognize a token only when we
already know its type. What we are now facing is nothing but horn (ii) of our
dilemma.
Here again, it helps to remember how the matter stands with the perception
of a material object. As we noticed before, there is a similar dilemma here.
Though only the spatial and temporal surface of the object is immedeately
given to us , we perceive the object enduring in time with its three dimensions.
On the other hand, we can perceive the surface of an object as a surface only if
we have an idea of a material object. Thus, though a material object is given to
us only through its surface, it seems that we can recognize a surface only when
we already have the idea of a material object.
We perceive a material object when we succeed in organizing various surface
perceptions into the perception of one particular material object. In order to be
able to do this, we need the idea of a material object in general as well as a way
to determine a particular material object whose surface perceptions we have.
The same thing applies to the case of linguistic expressions. We need the
idea of a linguistic type in general as well as a way to determine a particular type
whose instance we have at hand. Just as the perception of a material object has
the form \here is a material object, one of whose surfaces this is," the perception
of a linguistic type has the form \here is a type, one of whose tokens this is." In
both cases, what we need is both an idea of a material object's having a surface
or a type's having a token as its instance and a way of recognizing a particular
material object or a particular linguistic type.
First, let us consider how we come to the idea of a material object in general,
or how we come to the idea of a linguistic type in general. For the case of the
idea of a material object, there seem to be at least three ways to answer this
question.
(a) We come to the idea of a material object by induction from our
experiences of its surfaces.
(b) Material objects are theoretical entities that are postulated by
us.
(c) The idea of a material object constitutes a part of our basic
conception of the world.
In the case of a linguistic expression, we have the same three options.
(a) We come to the idea of a type by induction from our experiences
of its tokens.
(b) Types are theoretical entities that are postulated by us.
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(c) The idea of a type constitutes a part of our basic conception of
the world.
Let us examine each of these three options in turn.
We have already argued against (a). Just as we cannot determine whether
or not two surfaces belong to the same body, if we know only the perceptible
properties of surfaces and their relations to each other, we cannot determine
whether or not two tokens are instances of the same type, if we know only the
perceptible properties of tokens and their relations to each other. Thus, however
great the amount of perception we might have of surfaces or tokens, we cannot
get the idea of a material object or a type from these perceptions alone.
Compared to (a), (b) might be thought to be a more reasonable position.
Let us take the concept of a word. In a given language, what constitutes a word
depends to a large extent on theoretical considerations, because the identity
of a word is closely connected with the question of how a string of expressions
should be articulated, and di®erent theories provide di®erent answers. The same
applies to the concept of a sentence. It is not too much exaggeration to say that
what constitues a sentence di®ers according to di®erent grammatical theories.
Such a consideration seems to lead us to the conclusion that linguistic types
like words and sentences are theoretical entities postulated by a grammatical
theory.
No doubt there are the concepts of words and sentences which depend on
grammatical theories. Does this imply that linguistic types in general are the-
oretical entities? If it does, we would have a strong reason to doubt the claim
we made before, namely, that we perceive a type when we perceive a linguistic
expression. For, whatever conception we might have of theoretical entities, it
would be true that they cannot be the objects of our perceptions, and hence,
if a linguistic type were a theoretical entity, it could not be the object of our
perception.
Here again, let us go back to the case of the perception of a material object.
The reason why we hesitate to regard material objects as theoretical entities
is that, if we did, we would have to conclude that what we perceive are not
material objects. However, there is no contradiction in thinking both that ma-
terial objects are not theoretical entities and that we should appeal to a theory
in order to get a more detailed conception of material objects. Our perception
of material objects is always an articulated perception of a scene consisting of
a number of objects. When we wish to answer in a systematic way the ques-
tions like where one object begins and ends, or how many objects there are in
a perceived scene, we need a theory.
We claim that the same consideration applies to the perception of linguistic
expressions. When we hear or see words, our perceptions of them are always
articulated. Just as there are no perceptions of physical scenes without any
articulation into various material objects, there are no perceptions of linguistic
expressions without articulating into words or phrases. But re°ections on how
we accomplisch such articulations, what sorts of principles are used in them,
and the like, do not belong to perceptual activity itself, but are a part of theo-
13
retical considerations about it. There is no contradiction between the fact that
grammatical categories like word and sentence can be characterized only by
theoretical considerations and the claim that linguistic types are not theoretical
entities and can be the objects of perception.
Thus, our considerations so far present alternative (c) as the most promising
way to explain the origin of the idea of type in general. We should hold that
the idea of type, in particular that of linguistic type, is as fundamental to our
conception of the world as the idea of material object. According to our idea
of type, a type has various tokens as its instances, just as a material body
presents to us various appearances which di®er with its position relative to us,
and in the perception of type, tokens play the part which perspectives play in
the perception of material objects.
Next, we have to consider how we can identify a particular linguistic type
when we have only various perceptions of sounds or shapes and the idea of
a linguisitic type in general. The corresponding problem in the case of the
perception of a material object is to explain how we can get hold of a particular
material object when we have only various surface perceptions which are not
necessarily of the same object, though we have the idea of a material object
in general. In both cases, we have to take into account an important fact that
perceptions are not passive states, but activities we engage in.
In the case of the perceptions of material objects, what we are directly
confronted with is the totality of the surface perceptions of various material
objects. As we have the idea of a material object in general, we know that these
surface perceptions are the perceptions of the surfaces of material objects. But
we don't know yet how these perceptions should be articulated in such way that
the perceptions of the surfaces of the same material object are classi¯ed as such.
This we accomplish by exploring our environment using our own bodies. We
might change the directions of our gaze, walk around in order to look at what
was not in sight before, put our ¯ngers on the surface of a body and move them
along it, and so on. We produce ourselves new surface perceptions in moving our
bodies or body parts intentionally, and try to integrate them as the perception
of a material object.
It should be still more obvious that our perceptions of linguistic types are
not possible without our actions. If we cannot even try to produce linguistic
tokens ourselves, we cannot expect to recognize types. We try to produce a
token with an intention of producing a token of the relevant type.
Consider what we do when we start learning some new language with an in-
structor. She gives us a sequence of sounds as a token of a word in the language.
We try to produce another sequence of sounds which we hope to be similar to
that given by the instructor, because we intend to produce another token of the
same word. What we aim in our e®orts is not reproducing a sequence of sounds
which resembles the sequence given to us as closely as possible, but producing
the one which we hope to be recognized as another token of the same word.
If the sounds we produced are not recognized as a token of the intended type,
then we make another trial with some changes and hope the result will be rec-
ognized as a token of the type as we intend. It is clear that the concept of type
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is essentially involved in our intention to produce the sounds we do.
The matter is more or less the same when we learn a new language without
an instructor. But, it does not mean that we can learn a language by ourselves.
We need the interactions with the people who already speak the language to get
recognition or correction of our performance. The fact that such inputs from
the others are necessary for our learning a language shows in turn the necessity
of our actions aiming at the others 9.
5 The Identity of a Language and the Fact of
Language Changes
I have been arguing that a language is a system consisting of type entities,
both simple and complex. Among simple types, there are those that operate
on other types and return new types, and others that are operated on. Take
some language, L. If we designate the totality of the types of the former kind
in L by C, and the totality of the types of the latter kind in L by V , then the
totality of the complex types of L can be designated as C(V ). But there is
more to a language. A language is not only a syntactic structure, but also a
semantic system. So, let us consider a relation M , which relates each element
of C(V ) to its meanings. As some elements of C(V ) may not have meaning by
themselves, M need not relate meanings to every element of C(V ). M is not
a (partial) function but a relation, because some elements of C(V ) may have
more than two meanings. There may be two di®erent meaning relations, M
and M 0, for the same C(V ); in such a case, we have two di®erent languages.
Thus, a language L can be represented as a pair of a system of types C(V ) and
a meaning relation M .
L = hC(V );Mi
This characterization of a language is very crude. In particular, it is cer-
tainly unrealistic that the semantic aspect of a language could be adequately
represented by the meaning relationM . However, apart from such defects, there
seems to be a fundamental di±culty in characterizing a language in this way.
The di±culty is caused by the fact that both of the elements which constitute
the language are abstract objects. Abstract objects do not exist in time. There-
fore, it is meaningless to talk about their changes. Obviously, this con°icts with
our belief that a language changes and does so constantly.
You might say that our way of characterizing a language is appropriate for
only arti¯cial languages, such as the languages of logic, and is not suitable to
natural languages like Japanese and English. However, there is no di®erence in
ontological status between an arti¯cial language and a natural language. Both
of them consist of words and sentences, which are type entities. As type entities
9Much more should be said about this topic. In particular, there exists a large amount
of relevant work done in the ¯elds of the pscychology of perception and natural language
processing.
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are abstract entities, it should follow that a language is also an abstract entity.
As an abstract entity, a language must be incapable of change. How can we talk
about the various changes in English or Japanese without any hint of con°ict
or di±culty?
We have come to such an impasse because our present way of talking about
a language is misleading, in two respects. Firstly, what is called a change in
a language is not a change in the language itself, which is impossible, but a
replacement of one language by another that is similar to it. Secondly, the
name of a natural language like \Japanese" or \English" is not a singular name
that designates a single language, but a common name that applies to a number
of di®erent languages. If these two points are fully appreciated, it will be obvious
that there is no con°ict between the abstractness of a language and the reality
of linguistic changes.
Linguistic changes are comparable to changes in the color of an object. When
we say the color of an apple has changed from green to red, we do not mean
that the color green itself has undergone a change and turned into red, but that
the apple has come to have a di®erent color. Just in the same way, when we
say a language has changed, what we mean is that people has come to use a
language which is a little di®erent from the one they used to speak.
There are two sorts of color changes. In one case, an object comes to have
an entirely di®erent color from the one which it used to have, as when an apple
turns from green to red. In another case, the change is slight, and both the
former and the present colors are called by the same name, as when the color
of an apple turns from light red to dark red. Just in the same way, there are
two sorts of changes concerning languages. One sort comprises the cases in
which people switch from one language to another; in such cases, people come
to speak an entirely di®erent language from the one they used to speak. This
sort of change used to happen in modern era as a result of colonialist policy. In
contrast to such drastic changes in the language in use, there are another sort
of changes which are not so drastic. In fact, such changes are very common and
constantly happening all around us. When a new word enters into a person's
vocaburary, she comes to speak a language which is not the same from the one
she used to speak, although she is still speaking \the same" language in another
sense of \the same." If we designate her new language by \L1" and old one
by \L2," then what I am saying is that, although L1 and L2 are not identical
because they have di®erent vocabularies, both of them belong to the one and
same language such as Japanese or French.
This means that a language name like \Japanese" or \French" is not a
singular name which denotes a particular object, but a common name applicable
to a plurality of objects 10. When a language is characterized as a system of type
entities with some meaning relation, it is inevitable what is currently regarded
as a language name turns out to be a general term applicable to a great number
of di®erent languages. This is not only true of the names of natural languages
10It is impossible to hold that \Japanese" is a singular name which denotes a type entity
whose tokens are various languages. For, in any type/token distinction a token must be a
concrete object, and any language is an abstract object as we have argued here.
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like \Japanese" and \French", but also the names of arti¯cial languages like
\Esperanto" and \¯rst-order language." It is nice that \¯rst-order language" is
a common name as it is. Each di®erent formulation of ¯rst-order language gives
rise to a di®erent language which belongs to a class of languages called \¯rst-
order language." 11 Earlier I compared a language change to a color change of
an object. However, a more ¯t analogy is the changes in car models. Carolla is a
car model manufactured by Toyota. On the surface, the name \Carolla" seems
to be a singular term which denotes a single type entity. However, the car model
called \Carolla" has changed many times since it ¯rst appeared many years ago,
and there existed di®erent models like Carolla E90 and Carolla E100. These
names of the variants of Carolla do not designate individual cars, but some
car types. Hence, we must conclude that the name \Carolla" is not a singular
name of a particular type entity, but a common name applicable to several types
relating to each other. And, when we mention the changes of Carolla, we are
talking about the fact that, during a certain period, there appeared one after
another various tokens of the di®erent car types which all belong to the same
kind Carolla. Similarly, a geographical \change" of Carolla can be explained by
the fact that there are various models belonging to the Carolla family which are
specially made for di®erent local markets.
Various type entities which are called \Carolla" have to resemble each other
in design and function which are characteristic to this brand. But such resemb-
lences are not enough by themselves. For one thing, for a car model to be called
\Carolla", it should come from a particular maker, namely, Toyota, or some
company which is o±cially related to Toyota. Suppose some maker which has
no o±cial relation to Toyota, manufactures a car which resembles very closely
to one of the models of the Carolla family; it will not be regarded as a \Carolla."
What is lacking in this case is a right sort of causal connection with a car model
which is recognized to be a Carolla. In other words, what is necessary for a car
model to be a Carolla is not a mere resemblance in design and function, but
such a resemblance with a right sort of causal connection.
Most of the things that are true of a car model are also true of a language.
All the languages to which the name \Japanese" are applicable, resemble each
other in their syntax and semantics; but, they have to resemble each other
because of some causal connection between them. It is true that car models
and languages cannnot enter into causal relations because they are not spatio-
temporal entities. In the case of car models, what enter into causal relations are
events like desigining and manufacturing. A new car model is a Carolla, because
its design was done by taking the preceding Carolla models as the starting-
point. Similary, in the case of languages, what enter into causal relations are
not languages themselves, but the uses of a language. A language is called
\Japanese," because it resembles the other languages which have been called
\Japanese" and its uses are causally connected with those languages which are
11Di®erent formulations of formal language like ¯rst-order language are usually thought to
result in the notational variants of the same language, not di®erent languages. However, it
will be a di±cult task to distinguish between a di®erence in notation and that in language in
a principled way then.
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recognizably Japanese.
I will give you two examples.
(1) When a person A has been raised in a society where Japanese is spoken,
and has come to speak a language, her language is also a Japanese, because
it resembles the languages spoken by A's elders and those languages are
an essential part of the causes of A's use of her language.
(2) Usually a person uses a great many number of languages in her life time,
but, in many cases, these languages are \the same" languages. If A uses a
language L1 at time t which is closely resembles the language L2 which A
has been using before t, then it is very likely that A's use of L2 is causally
responsible for A's use of L1. Hence, L1 is \the same" language as L2.
Each time we acquire a word or start to use a new turn of phrase, we switch
to a new language which is di®erent from the one we have been using until then.
But it is still the same \Japanese." A very drastic change, or an accumulation
of changes over the long period of time may result in a language which is no
longer considered to be Japanese. For, in such a case, the loss of resemblance is
so great that it cannot be compensated for by a mere causal connection.
The boundary between what is Japanese and what is not Japanese is vague,
just as the boundary between di®erent colors are vague. There is nothing sur-
prsing in this, because \Japanese" is a common name and it is a well-known fact
that many common names have only vague extensions. The vagueness of the
boundary between Japanese and non-Japanese does not mean that a language is
a vague entity. Each single language is an abstract object and there is nothing
vague about it. The reason why Japanese has only a vague pro¯le is that it
comprises an innumerable number of di®erent languages.
Some puzzles are believed to exist relating to the concept of language iden-
tity. In particular, it has been claimed that the \identity" between languages
is not transitive 12. Suppose the \identity" between two languages consists in
the fact that the speakers of the one can communicate easily and °uently with
the speakers of the other. Then, there may exist three languages L1, L2 and L3
with the following properties:
1. L1 and L2 are identical in the sense above,
2. L2 and L3 are identical in the same way,
but
3. L1 and L3 are not identical, because the speakers of L1 cannot
communicate with the speakers of L3.
For example, suppose there are three areas A, B and C such that B lies between
A and C, and there is no immediate contact between A and C. Suppose further
that there have been daily exchanges between the people of A and those of B,
and the same is true with B and C. In such a situation it might happen that
12Nobuharu Tanji, Gengo to Ninshiki no Dainamizumu (The Dynamism of Language and
Knowledge), 1996, Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
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A's people and B's people can communicate with each other with no di±culty
and the same is true with B's people and C's people, but A's people and C's
people cannot commnucate with each other. In such a case, A's language is
not identical with C's language, although the languages spoken in A and B are
identical and those spoken in B and C are identical. In addition to such an
example of geographical changes of language, we can easily think up a similar
example of historical changes of language.
However, this argument rests on the confusion between the two di®erent
senses of \same." What is charactereized here as the identity between languages
are not the numerical identity between individual languages, but the generic
identity between them. Two languages are identical in a generic sense when
they belong to the same kind of language and are called by the same name. If
we interpret \identical" in the above argument as \identical in a generic sense,"
there will remain nothing puzzling about it, just as there is nothing puzzling with
the existence of three color hues H1, H2 and H3 with the following properties:
1. H1 and H2 are the same color, because they cannot be distin-
guished from each other,
2. H2 and H3 are the same color just as H1 and H2 are,
but
3. H1 and H3 are not the same color, because they can be distin-
guished from each other.
Thus, our view of language identity gives us a natural solution to such puz-
zles. They turn out to be yet another class of puzzles relating to vague concepts
known as the sorites paradoxes. Moreover, it gives a natural explanation of
the apparetly paradoxical fact that a language seems to admit temporal and
geographical changes in spite of being an abstract object which does not exist
in space and time.
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